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1.	Introduction	
	
This	paper	identifies	and	evaluates	some	central	relativistic	and	historicist	themes	in	early-
twentieth-century	German	sociology	of	knowledge.	The	two	main	figures	are	Georg	Simmel	
(1858-1918)	and	Karl	Mannheim		(1893-1947).		
	 Concentrating	on	Simmel	and	Mannheim	might	seem	surprising	in	a	volume	focussed	
on	philosophical	positions	concerning	relativism.	Indeed,	Simmel	and	Mannheim	are	today	
primarily	remembered	as	amongst	the	most	influential	‘founding	fathers’	of	the	social	
sciences.	It	is	important,	however,	to	remember	that	the	two	men	worked	in	an	academic	
world	in	which	the	borders	between	philosophy	and	the	social	sciences	were	unclear	and	
open	(cf.	Goodstein	2017).	Moreover,	Simmel	never	held	a	chair	in	sociology	and	did	not	
think	of	himself	as	a	sociologist.	And	both	thinkers	put	forward	ideas	and	theories	that	
were	recognized	as	philosophical	and	sociological	by	their	contemporaries.
	 Neither	‘relativism’	nor	‘historicism’	had	a	precise	and	agreed-upon	meaning	in	early-
twentieth-century	debates.	Still,	put	in	very	general	terms,	‘relativism’	referred	to	the	
denial	of	truths	that	are	universal,	fixed,	and	independent	of	human	psychology	and	
cultures.	‘Historicism’	meant	the	idea	that,	to	understand	any	phenomenon,	one	needs	to	
understand	its	history.	Obviously,	these	two	ideas	could	be	combined.		
	 Simmel	and	Mannheim	systematically	reflected	on	the	relationship	between	relativism	
and	historicism.	They	were	not	the	first	to	do	so.	Historical	and	philosophical	theorizing	
about	the	status	of	history	(as	a	field	of	study)	had	already	highlighted	the	tensions	
between	historical	contingency	and	philosophical	normativity.	The	novel	element	in	Simmel	
and	Mannheim	was	their	efforts	to	bring	these	issues	to	bear	on	the	philosophy	of	the	
social	sciences	in	general,	and	the	sociology	of	knowledge	in	particular.	
	 In	Simmel’s	and	Mannheim’s	work	relativism	and	historicism	featured	in	at	least	three	
different	ways.	First,	both	developed	and	defended	distinctive	general	claims	about	various	
kinds	of	“relativism”.	Second,	in	their	historical	case	studies,	Simmel	and	Mannheim	made	
use	of,	what	they	regarded	as,	“relativistic”	methodologies.	And	third,	both	Mannheim	
made	the	emergence	of	relativism	and	historicism	a	central	topic	for	their	sociological-
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historical	inquiries.	Finally,	to	these	three	dimensions	of	relativism	within	Simmel’s	and	
Mannheim’s	writings,	we	can	add	a	fourth	that	goes	beyond:	their	writings	triggered	
vigorous	and	extensive	debates	about	relativism.		
	 My	overall	evaluative	thesis	is	that	my	early	sociologists	of	knowledge	were	not	fully	
successful	in	dealing	with	relativism.	Simmel	declared	himself	a	relativist	but	it	remains	
unclear	what	precisely	his	relativism	amounted	to.	Mannheim	had	a	clearer	view	of	
relativism	but	thought	of	it	as	something	the	sociology	of	knowledge	had	to	avoid	at	all	
costs.	But	he	hardly	succeeded	in	his	attempts	to	do	so.	Fortunately,	in	neither	case	did	the	
lack	of	success	regarding	the	philosophical	handling	of	relativism	weaken	the	quality	and	
interest	of	the	sociological-historical	case	studies.	
	
2.	Simmel	on	Money	and	Philosophy	
	
A	natural	starting	point	for	my	investigation	is	Simmel’s	Philosophie	des	Geldes	
(1900/2004).	I	am	here	only	considering	its	nascent	sociology	of	philosophy,	to	wit,	its	
attempts	to	identify	parallels	between	philosophical	ideas	and	economic	practices	or	
theorising.	Simmel	claims	that	such	type	of	inquiry	has	been	made	possible	by	the	
“worldview”	of	“relativism”	(142).		
	 The	central	contrast	running	through	the	book	is	between	modern	and	
ancient/medieval	interpretations	of	money.	The	ancient	or	medieval	rendering	amounted	
to	a	“materialist	conception”	(173):	the	value	of	money	is	the	“substance”	out	which	it	is	
made	(167).	Moreover,	influential	thinkers,	like	Aquinas,	insisted	that	money	should	not	be	
traded	or	lent	for	interest	(168).	Closely	related	to	this	was	the	“just	price	doctrine”,	the	
idea	of	“a	direct	relationship	between	object	and	money-price”	(125).	As	Simmel	has	it,	the	
substance-value	conception	was	“the	appropriate	theoretical	expression	of	an	actual	
sociological	condition”,	and	the	conception	fell	apart	when	the	condition	disappeared	
(173).	The	condition	in	question	was	that	people	in	ancient	and	medieval	times	valued	
“landed	property”	(234)	and	“an	agrarian	economy	…	with	few	and	hardly	variable	
intermediaries”	(235).		
	 This	rough	sketch	suffices	for	us	to	see	how	Simmel	links	the	“materialist	conception	of	
money”	to	philosophy.	He	proposes	that	this	conception	was	inseparable	from	–	that	is,	
both	supported	by	and	supportive	of	–	the	metaphysical	topoi	of	fixed	substances	with	
essential	or	accidental	properties;	a	static,	eternal	cosmos	(168);	a	static	social	organization	
(234);	and	forms	of	philosophy	focused	on	qualitative	rather	than	quantitative	categories	
(148).		
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	 Turning	from	Antiquity	and	the	Middle	Ages	to	Modernity,	Simmel	insists	that	the	
modern,	“transcendental”,	understanding	of	money	radically	broke	with	its	predecessors.	It	
was	Adam	Smith	who	first	articulated	the	new	“transcendental	theory”	(173).	Most	human	
relationships	were	now	understood	as	relationships	of	exchange.	Indeed,	economic	
exchange	was	rendered	the	basic	building	block	of	society		(99).	Exchange	was	taken	to	be	
“as	productive	and	value-creating	as	is	prodution	itself”	(81).	Simmel	emphasises	especially	
the	ways	in	which	the	market	mechanism	turns	numerous	different	subjective	preferences	
into	one	objective	value	(i.e.	the	stable	price)	(75-76).			
	 Simmel	finds	numerous	parallels	between	key	aspects	of	modern	monetary	reality	or	
economic	theorizing	and	philosophical	reflection.	Suffice	it	here	to	mention	three.	The	first	
concerns	“relativity”:	the	economic	value	of	each	good	is	dependent	upon	–	and	thus	
relative	to	–	the	economic	value	of	every	other	good.	Money	“symbolizes”	such	relativity	
(118).	The	relativity	of	money	has	its	philosophical	analogue	in	the	emergence	of	various	
forms	of	relativism.	The	second	parallel	might	be	called	the	‘dual	perspective	point’:	on	the	
one	hand,	money	stands	aside	from,	or	opposite	to,	all	goods	that	can	be	bought	and	sold	
with	its	help.	But,	on	the	other	hand,	for	the	moderns,	money	is	also	itself	a	good	(119).	In	
the	philosophical	domain	this	corresponds	to	a	view	of	epistemic	norms	as	both	
constitutive	of	space	and	time,	and	as	empirical-psychological	phenomena	in	spatio-
temporally	situated	subjects	(119),	and	a	view	of	the	ego	as	both	transcendental	and	
empirical	(128).	The	third	key	link	between	modern	money	and	philosophy	concerns	
“condensation”.	For	the	modern	thinkers	money	“condenses”	the	value	of	things	(197).	The	
philosophical	counterparts	of	this	idea	vary:	they	include	the	notion	of	“laws	of	nature”	as	
condensations	of	“endless	particular	cases”		(303);	the	modern	idea	of	the	“state”	that	–	
with	the	help	of	the	civil	service	–	functions	as	a	condensation	of	political	powers	(197);	and	
the	conception	of	“objectivity”	as	condensed	intersubjectivity	(79).	
	
3.	Simmel	on	Historicism	and	Relativism	
	
Simmel	emphasizes	repeatedly	that	the	modern	understanding	of	money	goes	together	
with	philosophical	relativism	and	historicism.	This	naturally	invites	the	question	how	
Simmel	conceived	of	relativism	and	historicism.	Simmel	most	influential	intervention	into	
the	historicism	debates	–	the	Probleme	der	Geschichtsphilosophie	(1892/1989)	–	discussed	
the	“historical	apriori”.2	This	is	the	idea	that	the	historian	invariably	imputes	mental	states	
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to	historical	actors,	and	that	the	selection	of	such	states	depends	crucially	on	the	
personality	and	social	background	of	the	historian	in	question	(304).	Accordingly,	Simmel	
rejects	Leopold	von	Ranke’s	(1795-1886)	demand	according	to	which	historians	must	
“eliminate	themselves”	in	order	to	understand	the	past	(321).	Moreover,	Simmel	takes	his	
insight	as	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	there	is	space	for	a	sociological	study	of	historical	
scholarship:	it	is	usually	possible	to	identify	the	social	position	of	the	historians	from	their	
texts	(325).	In	some	places	Simmel	accepts	the	natural	implication	that	all	historical	work	is	
invariably	perspectival	(328).	
	 Simmel’s	“historical	apriori”	resonated	with	many	other	authors	at	the	time.	One	
obvious	case	in	point	is	Theodor	Lessing’s	(1872-1933)	Geschichte	als	Sinngebung	des	
Sinnlosen	(1921/2012).	The	title	sums	up	the	content	perfectly.	Ernst	Troeltsch’s	(1865-
1923)	Der	Historismus	und	seine	Probleme	(1922/1977)	attributes	to	Simmel	the	intention	
to	overcome	“suffocating	‘historical	realism’”	(578).	But	Troeltsch	is	not	satisfied	with	
Simmel’s	reflections:	“To	Dilthey’s	relativism	of	values	he	[i.e.	Simmel]	adds	a	shaky	
relativism	concerning	the	relationship	between	the	reality	of	experience	and	the	
construction	of	historical	knowledge.	Historicism	is	overcome	by	means	of	its	radical	…	self-
application;	but	really,	it	falls	into	a	void,	and	nobody	gains	anything”	(582).	
	 Not	everyone	agreed	with	Troeltsch.	Using	Simmel’s	historical	apriori	as	a	premise,	
Max	Scheler	(1874-1928)	influentially	declared	historicism	self-undermining	(1926/1960:	
135-158).	The	historicist	claims	the	historical	record	to	show	that	epistemic	and	moral	
standards	vary	between	cultures	and	epochs.	In		so	doing,		the	historicist	“naïvely”	assumes	
there	to	be	“historical	facts”.	This	is	naïve	since	historicist	reflection	itself	maintains	that	
historical	facts	are	“relative	to	the	present”.	Historicism	has	thereby	robbed	itself	of	the	
data	which	could	provide	it	with	empirical	support.	Historicism	refutes	itself.		
	 What	did	Simmel	himself	think	of	relativism	and	historicsm	as	philosophical	positions?	
How	did	he	interpret	the	historical	apriori?	Did	he	agree	with	Troeltsch	that	his	position	was	
a	radical	relativism?		
	 To	begin	with	the	historical	apriori,	Simmel	did	not	hold	that	all	perspectives	are	
equally	good.	For	instance,	while	he	is	adament	that	some	aspects	of	historical	actors’	
experiences	might	never	be	understood,	he	does	not	draw	the	relativistic	conclusion	that	
therefore	historical	sources	are	infinitely	plyable	(1892/1989:	326).	He	adds	that	when	
historians	investigate	the	experiences	of	past	groups	–	rather	than	past	individuals	–	their	
chances	of	getting	at	the	original	sentiments	are	high.	This	is	because	groups	have	“general,	
big	and	coarse	interests”	(331)	that	do	not	much	change	over	time.	Simmel	also	leaves	
room	for	the	historian	“genius”	who	is	able	to	grasp	past	experiences	to	a	higher	degree	
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than	anyone	else.	The	genius	does	so	on	the	basis	of	“innate	memories	of	the	species”	
(328).	Moreover,	Simmel	writes	that	“we	are	able	to	reconstruct	the	psychological	
processes	of	others	and	with	a	strong	feeling	of	being	totally	correct	…”	(328);	or	that	
“there	is	enough	evidence”	for	the	“monistic	belief”	that	thought	is	largely	“uniform	and	
simple”	(337).	Simmel	is	somewhat	less	optimistic	when	it	comes	to	historical	laws	or	
philosophies	of	history.	Here	there	is	little	chance	to	overcome	or	adjudicate	competing	
proposals.	Simmel	weakens	the	relativism	of	these	claims,	however,	by	declaring	historical	
laws	and	philosophies	of	history	to	be	of	merely	heuristic	value	(421):	as	guides	for	research	
they	do	not	postulate	conflicting	truths.		
	 As	far	as	relativism	in	the	Philosophie	des	Geldes	is	at	issue,	we	need	to	attend	
primarily	to	the	“relativity”	point:	the	modern	understanding	of	money	corresponds	to	a	
diverse	set	of	philosophical		“relativisms”.	To	begin	with	epistemic	justification,	Simmel	
holds	that	it	is	relative	to	epistemic	principles.	And	since	these	principles	need	to	be	
justified	in	turn,	we	end	up	in	an	infinite	or	circular	chain.	Simmel	actually	insists	that	the	
chain	is	both	infinite	and	circular	at	the	same	time.	It	is	infinite	insofar	as	we	are	unable	to	
reach	absolute	principles	as	ultimate	stopping	points.	It	is	circular	insofar	as	our	justifying	
activity	is	never	able	to	step	beyond	the	circle	of	beliefs	(1900/2004:	101-103).3	Somewhat	
abruptly	Simmel	adds	an	evolutionary	epistemology	according	to	which	a	representation	is	
justified	if,	and	only	if,	it	has	been	produced	by	a	psychological	mechanism	which	adds	to	
the	fitness	of	the	species.	None	of	the	“worldviews”	of	different	species	“copy”	the	external	
world	“in	its	objectivity”.	They	all	have	their	own	truth	(ibid.:	104).	
	 Simmel’s	ontological	relativism	relates	to	the	distinction	between	Medieval	and	
Modern	ways	of	thinking:	the	ontology	of	substances	has	given	way	to	an	ontology	of	
(quantitative)	relations.	There	is	no	fact	of	the	matter	as	to	which	ontology	is	absolutely	
correct.	Still,	the	thought	of	“the	general	relativity	of	the	world”	is	the	natural	“adjustment	
on	the	part	of	our	intellect”	to	contemporary	“social	and	subjective	life	in	which	money	has	
found	its	real	effective	embodiment	and	the	reflected	symbol	of	its	forms	and	movements”	
(ibid.:	518).	This	line	of	reasoning	makes	Simmel	a	historicist	relativist	about	the	conflict	
between	(ontological)	absolutism	and	relativism.	
	 Finally	there	is	philosophical	“relativism”	concerning	opposites	like	“pluralism”	and	
“monism”,	“realism”	and	“idealism”,	“subjectivism”	and	“objectivism”:	Simmel	treats	them	
all	as	“heuristic	principles”.	“Objective	truth”	results	from	the	interplay	of	many	different	
such	principles	(ibid.:	112).	
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	 Was	all	this	relativism	by	the	standards	of	the	time?	Here	one	key	litmus	test	was	–	as	
the	Neokantians	or	Phenomenologists	were	urging	–	whether	the	given	theory	conflated	
“Genese	und	Geltung”	(causal	origin	and	validity).	Simmel	declared	himself	“not	guilty”.	He	
emphasizes	that	the	Law	of	Gravity	“belongs	within	the	category	of	the	valid	and	
meaningful	that	is	not	open	to	further	[psychological	or	sociological]	analysis”	(1892/1989:	
105).	And	elsewhere	he	sharply	distinguishes	between	“positive	ethics”	(i.e.	the	sociology	
and	psychology	of	ethics)	and	“prescriptive	ethics”	(1892-93/1989:	10-11).	Max	Adler	
(1919:	10)	reports	that	“usually	by	relativism	one	means	a	state	of	mind	which	denies	the	
possibility	of	universally	valid	claims	and	which	reduces	the	validity	of	our	judgments	
ultimately	to	their	practical	usefulness	…”	Adler	insists	that	“nothing	of	all	this	fits	Simmel’s	
intellectual	dispositions”.	Max	Frischeisen-Köhler	(1920)	also	suggests	that	“relativism”	
cannot	be	used	to	characterize	Simmel’s	position.	His	reason	is	that	relativism	has	become	
“too	general	and	vague”	a	term	for	it	to	be	useful	as	a	characterization	of	any	philosopher.	
Still,	judged	by	Edmund	Husserl’s	(1859-1938)	attack	on	“psychologism”,	every	form	of		
evolutionary	epistemology	is	“psychologistic”	(i.e.	species	relativism)	(1900/1970:	§36).	
Thus	by	Husserl’s	criteria	Simmel’s	evolutionary	epistemology	is	relativistic.	
	 Are	Simmel’s	relativisms	relativistic	by	our	standards	today?	It	seems	right	to	say	that	
by	most	standards	Simmel	would	at	least	qualify	as	an	ontological	relativist.	Which	
ontological	theory	we	accept	depends	on	the	culture	we	live	in,	and	there	is	no	higher	court	
of	appeal.	As	far	as	epistemic	relativism	is	concerned,	the	issue	is	difficult	to	decide.	
Simmel’s	insistence	on	infinite	chains	of	justification,	or	his	evolutionary	speculations	would	
not	be	counted	as	obviously	relativistic	by	most	of	today’s	epistemologists.	His	references	
to	the	circle	of	beliefs	sound	like	a	form	of	coherence	theory.	And	it	is	an	open	debate	
whether	and	to	what	extent	the	coherence	theory	of	epistemic	justification	has	relativistic	
leanings	(Steizinger	2015).		
	 Summa	summarum:	It	is	hard	to	capture	Simmel’s	enthusiastic	search	for	ever	new	
forms	of	relativism	in	today’s	categories	and	classifications.	While	one	can	recognize	certain	
familiar	relativistic	motifs,	the	overall	position	remains	elusive.	
	
4.	Mannheim	on	Conservatism	
	
Turning	from	Simmel	to	Mannheim,	the	first	central	text	for	my	concerns	is	his	
Habilitationschrift	“Altkonservatismus”	(1925/1986).	This	is	a	study	of	four	legal	
philosophers	and	jurists	in	the	early	eighteenth	century:	Justus	Möser	(1720-1794),	Adam	
Heinrich	Müller	(1779-1829),	Gustav	von	Hugo	(1764-1844),	and	Friedrich	Carl	von	Savigny	
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(1779-1861).	As	Mannheim	explains,	they	formulated	conservatism	as	a	new	“thought-
style”,	opposed	to	the	“bourgeois-revolutionary	style,	the	natural-law	mode	of	thinking”	
(102).	A	thought-style	is	motivated	by	social-political	interests	and	“constitutes	a	world”	by	
means	of	its	own	specific	vocabulary	(51,	56).	Conservatism	can,	but	need	not,	combine	
with	romanticism.	Romanticism	arises	in	opposition	to	a	“thorough-going	rationalisation	of	
the	world”.	It	is	motived	by	the	“displaced”	and	“irrational”	(59,	65,	66).	Political	
conservatism	is	an	“objective”,	“historical-dynamic	structural	complex”	(75).	It	presupposes	
a	“society	differentiated	into	classes”	(86).	
	 One	of	Mannheim’s	central	aims	is	to	develop	a	“morphology	of	conservative	
thought”,	and	to	identify	its	“inner	formative	principle”	(87).	By	Mannheim’s	reckoning	this	
principle	is	the	clinging	to	the	concrete.	For	instance,	property	(in	Möser)	is	a	“definite,	
vital,	and	reciprocal	relationship	between	the	owner	and	the	thing	owned”	(89).	Freedom	
must	be	concrete	not	abstract;	it	must	be	tied	to	our	“individual	laws”.	Ranke	later	insisted	
that	freedom	must	tied	to	estates	or	the	state	(93).		
	 Mannheim	holds	that	the	conservative	thought-style	can	only	be	understood	as	the	
negation	of	the	earlier	“natural-law	thought-style”.	The	latter	was	understood	by	
conservatives	as	having	the	following	ingredients	(106-107):		
	
	
	 (A)		Doctrines	of	…		 (B)		Thinking	
		
	 the	state	of	nature	 rationalism	
	 the	social	contract	 eduction	from	principles	
	 popular	sovereignty		 universal	principles	
	 Rights	of	Man	 universal	applicability	of	all	laws	
	 	 atomism	and	mechanism	
	 	 static	thinking	 	
	 	 	
	 The	conservative	response	took	the	form	of	insisting	that	social	organisms	are	unique;	
this	precluded	universal	principles	or	universal	laws	(108).	It	also	favoured	totalities	
(cultures,	traditions)	over	individuals.	And	against	“reason”	it	stressed	the	importance	of	
“history,	life,	nation”	(107),	and	celebrated	the	“irrationality	of	reality”	(108).	To	be	precise,	
it	was	only	the	first	generation	of	conservatives	that	attacked	reason	outright.	Later	
generations	–	esp.	Hegel	–	aimed	to	fuse	history	and	rationality	by	developing	dynamic	
conceptions	of	reason	(109).	
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	 Abstract	morphology	to	one	side,	Mannheim	also	seeks	to	illuminate	the	actual	
historical	development.	The	“first	conservative	position”	(in	Möser)	was	a	reaction	of	the	
Prussian	nobility	and	its	middle-class	“ideologues”	against	“bureaucratic-absolutist	
rationalism”	(112-114).	The	ideologues	were	“socially	unattached	intellectuals”	who	“hired	
out	their	pens”;	they	were	“archetypal	apologists”.	(116-119).	Importantly,	(philosophy	of)	
history	now	became	a	key	focus.	For	Mannheim	this	is	“the	positive	element”	(118)	in	
conservatism.	Möser	emphasized	old	customs	and	habits;	every	town	should	have	its	own	
laws	(134).	Historicism	emerged	once	the	interest	in	history	became	pronounced.	
“Historicism	is	…	of	conservative	origin,”	Mannheim	wrote.	He	explaines	that	we	reach	
historicism	“when	the	process	whereby	things	have	come	about	is	itself	experienced	with	
feeling”	(127).	In	this	context	Mannheim	applauds	“…	the	fruitful	relativism	flowing	out	of	
historicism	…	which	renders	even	the	observer	relative	to	the	process	of	becoming	which	
moves	over	and	through	him”	(126).	Mannheim	adds:	“This	form	of	thinking	…	has	in	effect	
become	a	historical	a	priori	for	us”	(143).		
	 Müller	is	the	central	figure	in	the	second	stage	the	development.	He	began	to	combine	
conservatism	with	romanticism.	Romanticism	means	an	emphasis	on	life	and	its	diversity.	
For	Mannheim	this	move	anticipated	“Lebensphilosophie”	(136-138).	Müller	was	generally	
sceptical	about	conceptual	thought.	No	concept	was	able	to	capture	the	dynamic	nature	of	
social	realities	(141).	Müller	aimed	to	make	thinking	similar	to	life:	this	meant	an	extensive	
use	of	analogy	and	conceiving	of	the	world	as	unfolding	according	to	diametrically	opposed	
principles	(143).	
	 The	third	phase	brought	a	consolidation	of	the	conservative	thought-style.	This	was	
the	time	of	the	“Historical	School”	and	von	Savigny.	The	latter	never	tired	of	attacking	the	
idea	of	general	(Napoleonic)	legal	codes:	“the	real	seat	of	law	is	the	common	consciousness	
of	the	people”	(156).	As	a	romantic	conservative	von	Savigny	discovered	irrationality	
everywhere,	including	in	the	individual	and	in	the	application	of	laws	(166-167).	Mannheim	
deems	von	Savigny	important	as	a	forerunner	of	the	humanities	of	his	(i.e.	Mannheim’s)	
time:	von	Savigny	developed	the	method	of	“elucidation”	(studying	phenomena	in	and	
through	their	historical	becoming)	that	informed	all	later	work	in	the	humanities	(184).	
	 A	second	important	figure	in	the	third	stage	of	the	development	was	von	Hugo.	He	
took	“…	a	preliminary	step	towards	the	fruitful	relativism	of	historicism”	by	developing	a	
“unique	relativism”	tied	to	“disillusioned	conservatism”	(176).	Von	Hugo	undermined	
natural	law	by	measuring	it	against	the	plurality	of	positive	law;	but	he	also	criticized	
positive	law	in	light	of	natural	law.	Neither	perspectives	was	ultimately	privileged.	von	Hugo	
strikes	Mannheim	as	a	forerunner	of	Max	Weber	(176).		
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5.	Mannheim	on	Historicism	and	Relativism	
	
Historicism	and	relativism	surface	at	many	points	in	the	Habilitationsschrift,	and	it	is	useful	
to	pull	together	the	main	themes	and	influences.	First,	historicism,	relativism,	and	
elucidation	are	said	to	be	“positive	elements”,		a	valuable	legacy,	of	political	conservatism;	
a	“historical	a	priori	for	us”.	Second,	from	Oswald	Spengler’s	(1880-1936)	Untergang	des	
Abendlandes	(1918/1991),	Mannheim	adopts	the	idea	of	a	“morphology”	of	“thought-
styles”,	and	of	“formative	principles”	that	“constitute”	their	respective	“worlds”	and	
incommensurable	languages.	Third,	Altkonservatismus	endorses	Simmel’s	conception	of	the	
historical	apriori:	Enlightenment	and	conservative	writing	of	history	are	said	to	have	been	
differrent;	and	at	least	by	implication	historical	worlds	must	be	worlds-for-different-
thought-styles.	Finally,	fourth,	Mannheim	does	not	allow	for	a	neutral	viewpoint.	The	fact	
that	intellectuals	were	“socially	unattached”	did	not	enable	them	to	achieve	such	
neutrality;	instead	they	were	forced	to	“hire	out	their	pens”.	
	 In	the	paper	“Historismus”	(1924/1964)	–	written	just	one	year	before	the	
Habilitationsschrift	was	presented	in	Heidelberg,	Mannheim	draws	a	somewhat	different	
picture	of	historicism	and	relativism.	One	central	motif	is	the	distinction	between	three	
different	fields	of	knowledge	and	their	respective	histories	(294).	These	fields	differ	in	the	
extent	to	which	they	are	affected	by	historicism.		
	 (i)		“Civilisation”:	this	is	the	realm	of	the	natural	sciences	and	mathematics,	of	“static	
truths”	and	progress	(282).	In	this	arena,	and	only	here,	the	rationalist	epistemologies	of	
Neokantianism	and	Phenomenology	have	traction.	These	sciences	are	not	affected	by	
historicism.		
	 (ii)	“Dialectic	Rationality”:	This	is	the	domain	of	philosophy	to	which	historicism	
applies.	Here	truth	is	“dynamic”,	and	can	only	be	captured	by	Hegelian	dialectic.	At	best,	
philosophical	systems	“express	the	truth	of	their	respective	epochs”	(287).	But	Mannheim	
also	speaks	of	“dialectical	truth”	as	the	truth	concerning	the	dynamics	and	telos	of	history	
(289).	
	 (iii)	“Soul-culture”:	This	is	where	the	historical-cultural	sciences	belong.	They	are	
committed	to	the	idea	that	“every	epoch	must	be	interpreted	through	its	very	own	soul-
centre”	(292).	This	is	in	line	with	historicism	or	relativism.	But	still,	Mannheim	deems	it	
possible	to	offer	a	criterion	of	truth	for	this	arena,	too:	it	is	to	grasp	the	object	“adequately	
in	its	full	depth”	(293).		
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	 A	second	central	motif	of	the	1924	paper	relates	to	the	“historical	apriori”.	Why	do	we	
assume	that	our	perspectives	are	able	to	adequately	capture	the	“historical	Dinge-an-sich”?	
Mannheim	thinks	that	“Troeltsch	found	the	right	starting	point”	for	an	answer	(276).	
Mannheim	is	referring	here	to	Troeltsch’s	cryptic	remark	that	“thought	must	…	have	a	
secret	link	to	reality”	(Troeltsch	1922/1977:	183):	historians’	perspectives	are	often	
adequate	to	their	subject	matter	since	both	the	perspectives	and	the	subject	matter	are	
products	of	one	and	the	same	historical	process.	Mannheim	expresses	the	thought	also	in	
idealist	garb:	“…	principally	the	absolute	…	can	be	grasped	only	…	in	categories	that	are	
shaped	by	[its	own]	process	of	becoming”;	“history	gives	us	concrete-contentful	standards;	
…	we	are	able	to	identify	them	only	because	we	already	have	them	instinctively,	insofar	as	
we	are	carried	by	the	total	spirit	...”	(1924/1964:	303-305)	
	 For	Mannheim	the	two	central	motifs	–	the	distinction	between	(i),	(ii),	(iii)	and	the	
development	of	the	absolute	spirit	–	are	connected.	The	absolute	spirit	has	been	invested	
in	the	three	forms	of	knowledge	to	different	degrees	in	different	epochs.	Mannheim	also	
suggests	that	different	social	classes	are	preferentially	drawn	to	one	of	the	realms.	But	no	
class	carries	the	“total	movement”	(296).	Although	Mannheim	admits	that	his	own	
philosophy	is	also	“tied	to	a	standpoint”,	he	still	deems	himself	capable	of	predicting	the	
next	step,	beyond	(iii).	This	next	step	is	the	challenge	to	find	a	perspective	from	which	the	
tripartite	distinction	of	fields	of	knowledge	(i)	to	(iii)	can	be	overcome.	
			 This	“pluralist”	(304)	theoretical	edifice,	Mannheim	believes,	can	be	used	to	block	the	
charge	of	relativism.	Different	perspectives	can	reach	partial	truths	—	insofar	as	the	
absolute	grants	these.	Different	truths	of	different	historical	periods	are	not	different	
interpretations	of	the	same,	but	interpretations	of	different	stages	of	the	absolute	or	spirit.	
This	is	not	to	say	that	perspectives	cannot	be	criticized.	But	the	main	criticism	that	can	be	
directed	at	them	is	that	they	overgeneralize:	they	claim	to	apply	to	a	much	wider	range	of	
phenomena	than	they	actually	do	(253).	
	 In	Mannheim’s	Ideologie	und	Utopie	(1931/1936)	we	get	yet	a	third	response	to	
historicism	and	relativism.	Mannheim	now	seeks	to	adapt	Marxist	vocabularies	and	motifs,	
especially	elements	of	Georg	Lukacs’	Geschichte	and	Klassenbewusstsein	(1923/2000).	
“Thought-styles”	are	replaced	with	“ideologies”	qua	holistic	systems	of	meaning	and	beliefs	
(1931/1936:	74).	Mannheim	now	also	puts	a	much	greater	emphasis	on	the	
“Seinsgebundenheit”	of	thought.	That	is,	the	knowledge	of	politics,	the	humanities	and	the	
social	sciences	are	all	tied	to	material	conditions	(243-44).	But	Mannheim	is	convinced	that	
the	thesis	of	the	Seinsgebundenheit	of	knowledge	does	not	commit	him	to	relativism.	
Mannheim	prefers	to	call	his	view	“relationism”:	“all	historical	knowledge	is	relational	
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knowledge”.	In	other	words,	different	bodies	of	knowledge	are	always	tied	to	different	
webs	of	meaning	and	beliefs,	and	to	specific	historical	situations.	This	is	why	a	strict	division	
between	Genese	and	Geltung	cannot	be	upheld	(76).	Of	course,	by	the	Neokantian	
standards,	denying	such	strict	division	was	precisely	what	qualified	Mannheim’s	position	as	
relativist.	
	 Nevertheless,	there	is	a	criterion	for	assessing	ideologies	or	theories,	Mannheim	
claims.	A	given	ideology	or	theory	is	correct	if	it	does	not	“prevent	man	from	adjusting	
himself	at	the	given	historical	stage”	(85).	Finally,	Mannheim	needs	an	epistemic	subject	for	
identifying	the	specific	Seinsgebundenheit	of	specific	ideologies	and	for	creating	
“syntheses”	out	of	them.	He	resurrects	a	key	figure	from	his	Altkonservatismus	study	(and	
Weber	[1923]):	the	“socially	unattached	(freischwebende)	intelligentsia”.	Its	epistemic	
privilege	rests	on	its	ability	to	replace	class-ties	with	“Bildung”	ties	(1931/1936:	138).	
	 Turning	from	Mannheim’s	views	to	their	reception,	in	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s	
Mannheim’s	views	triggered	what	in	retrospect	we	might	call	the	“Sociologism	Wars”.	Since	
I	have	analysed	these	debates	at	greater	length	elsewhere	(Kusch	1999),	and	since	I	return	
to	them	below,	suffice	it	to	say	that	Mannheim’s	position	was	attacked	from	every	end	of	
the	political	spectrum.	Key	points	of	contention	were	the	restriction	of	Seinsgebundenheit	
to	the	social	sciences	and	the	humanities	(Sombart);	an	excessive	or	insufficient	proximity	
to	Marx	(A.	Weber,	Neurath);	the	inflationary	use	of	“ideology”	(Jonas,	Stern,	Tillich);	the	
Hegelianism	of	the	Historismus	paper	(Horkheimer);	and	–	of	course	–	Mannheim’s	alleged	
relativism	(Grünwald).	(Kusch	1999)	
	 Which	naturally	brings	us	to	the	question	whether	Mannheim	is	a	relativist	by	today’s	
standards.	This	is	best	answered	separately	for	the	three	key	texts.	It	is	hard	to	see	how	one	
could	read	the	Altkonservatismus	study	as	anything	but	a	relativistic	investigation.	The	
extensive	use	of	Spenglerian	categories	and	ideas	commits	Mannheim	to	a	form	of	cultural	
relativism	based	on	incommensurable	thought-styles.	The	account	of	the	Historismus	paper	
avoids	relativism,	but	at	the	high	price	of	a	Hegelian	metaphysics.	Finally,	the	position	of	
Ideologie	und	Utopie	escapes	the	relativism-charge	only	by	relying	on	the	assumption	of	the	
“free-floating	intelligentsia”.	
	
	6.	Interpretation	and	Evaluations	
	
I	now	turn	to	some	evaluative	comments,	using	existing	criticism	as	my	starting	points.	I	
begin	with	problems	in	Simmel’s	case	study	of	money	and	philosophy.		
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	 The	first	issue	to	be	assessed	is	Simmel’s	relativistic	methodology.	Contemporary	
critics	found	it	unconvincing.	For	Emile	Durkheim	(1858-1917)	Simmel	is	wrong	to	isolate	
various	forms	and	conceptions	of	money	from	the	institutions	that	make	them	possible	
(1902/1980:	98).	Durkheim	also	condemns	Simmel’s	“bastard	speculation”	as	a	mixture	of	
scientific	observation	and	artistic	intuition”	(ibid.).	Max	Weber	(1864-1920),	both	in	his	Die	
protestantische	Ethik	und	der	Geist	des	Kapitalismus	(1904-5/1976)	and	in	a	1908-
manuscript	(1908/1970),	is	also	critical.	In	the	book	he	rejects	the	way	in	which	Simmel	
detaches	modern	money	from	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	(1904-5/1976:	193,	185).	
In	the	manuscript	Weber	reports	that	the	money-book	triggers	“out-right	explosions	of	
rage”	amongst	economists	(1908/1970:	161).	Weber	sees	the	main	culprit	in	Simmel’s	
undisciplined	use	of	analogy	(ibid.:	160).	It	is	hard	to	disagree.	
	 Perhaps	there	is	a	way,	however,	to	redeem	Simmel’s	Philosophie	des	Geldes.	
Remember	that	Simmel	took	the	book	to	be	a	contribution	to	the	philosophy	of	history	and	
that	for	him	philosophies	of	history	are	not	strictly	true	or	false.	Their	value	is	to	be	
measured	by	how	useful	they	are	as	heuristic	tools,	that	is,	as	temporary	signposts	for	
empirical	work,	and	as	ultimately	and	ideally	fully	superseded	by	the	latter.	Taken	in	that	
sense,	we	might	think	of	Simmel	as	urging	sociologists	to	determine	the	ways	in	which	
economic	theorizing	and	financial	practices	have	influenced	philosophical	thought.	Treating	
Simmel’s	book	in	this	way	is	to	treat	it	the	way	we	nowadays	think	of	other	such	sweeping	
theses,	for	instance,	the	“Sombart	Thesis”	(Sombart	1902)	according	to	which	double	book-
keeping	brought	about	the	Scientific	Revolution;	the	“Weber	Thesis”	(Weber	1904-5)	on	the	
interaction	between	Protestantism	and	capitalism;	or	the	“Merton	Thesis”	(Merton	1938)	
on	Pietism	and	early	experimental	science.	These	sweeping	theses	are	overgeneralizations	
and	false	as	such.	But	they	are	highly	suggestive	of	more	restricted	and	local	case	studies	
(e.g.	on	the	influence	of	game-theory	in	political	philosophy).	
	 As	far	as	Simmel’s	more	general	comments	on	relativism	and	historicism	are	
concerned,	the	early	responses	were	either	highly	critical	or	excessively	charitable.	I	have	
already	quoted	Troeltsch’s	dismissive	assessment	above	(1922/1977:	582).	More	
sympathetic	commentators	like	Adler	(1919)	or	Frischeisen-Köhler	(1920)	confirm	that	
Troeltsch’s	assessment	was	typical	of	the	times.	Curiously,	Adler	and	Frischeisen-Köhler	
then	go	on	to	defend	Simmel	against	the	charge	of	relativism	by	rendering	the	doctrine	in	
ways	Simmel	himself	would	have	rejected:	Simmel	does	not	(like	Frischeisen-Köhler)	take	
relativism	to	be	undefinable;	and	he	does	not	(like	Adler)	conceive	of	relativism	as	a	
reduction	of	truth	to	utility.		
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	 The	debate	over	Simmel’s	relativism	has	not	ended	in	the	1920s.	Raymond	Bourdon	
(1989)	suggests	that	Simmel	is	a	anti-skeptical	“neokantian	relativist”	seeking	to	identify	
“variable	apriori	assumptions”	(1989:	415).	Bourdon’s	interpretation	belongs	to	a	French	
tradition	of	reading	Simmel	that	Gregor	Fitzi	(2002)	traces	back	to	the	early	twentieth	
century.	On	this	interpretation	Simmel’s	relativism	is	a	“transcendental	philosophy	aware	of	
its	limits	in	both	epistemology	and	ethics”	(2002:	247).	One	need	not	disagree	with	this	
suggestion	to	feel	that	it	gets	at	only	some	aspects	of	Simmel’s	overall	relativist	aspirations.	
For	instance,	it	has	nothing	to	say	about	Simmel’s	ontological	relativism.	
	 Commentators	from	the	realm	of	cultural	studies	have	highlighted	other	aspects	of	
Simmel’s	position.	Deena	and	Michael	A.	Weinstein	celebrate	Simmel’s	“historicism”	or	
“postmodern	form	of	historizing”	as	“a	kind	of	radical	pragmatism	…	History	is	the	freedom	
of	the	historian	to	historize	according	to	any	interest	in	the	past	…	so	long	as	the	control	of	
fact	is	respected”	(1993:	183).	Elizabeth	S.	Goodstein	(2017:	86,	160)	holds	that	“Simmel	
deployed	epistemic	relativism	…	as	a	means	of	overcoming	what	appear	to	be	aporetic	
dualisms—between	materialism	and	idealism,	determination	and	freedom,	life	and	form	…”	
Goldstein	believes	that	even	the	opposition	between	relativism	and	absolutism	is	overcome	
where	Simmel’s	“relativized	relativism”	historicizes	both.	Goodstein’s	remark	is	indeed	a	
helpful	observation.		
	 Finally,	Klaus	Christian	Köhnke	(1995:	480)	and	Wilfried	Geßner	(2003:	92-3)	suggest	
that	Simmel’s	relativism	is	really	a	form	of	Mannheimian	“relationism”.	The	reason,	
according	to	Geßner,	is	that	Simmel’s	intentions	are	antiskeptical	and	aiming	to	“combine	
the	objectivity	of	validity	with	the	relativity	of	origin”.	Unfortunately,	neither	author	then	
goes	on	to	defend	the	coherence	and	plausibility	of	Mannheim’s	relationism.		
	 As	I	already	indicated	in	the	last	section,	Mannheim’s	attempt	to	steer	a	path	between	
relativism	and	absolutism	did	not	meet	with	much	enthusiasm	in	the	1920s.	Max	
Horkheimer	insisted	that	Mannheim	should	have	followed	Marx	on	this	point.	Whereas	
Marx	had	taken	the	view	that	all	knowledge	was	relative	to	class,		Mannheim	was	trying	to	
re-introduce	an	absolutistic	perspective.		For	Mannheim	all	particular	viewpoints	ultimately	
seemed	to	fit	together	into	one	big	absolute	viewpoint	(Horkheimer	1929/1982:	486).			
	 Ernst	Grünwald	chose	a	different	line	of	attack.	Grünwald	accused	Mannheim’s	
sociology	of	knowledge	of	being	both	“absurd”	and	“false”.	The	charge	of	absurdity	is	
justified	as	follows:	“‘Relationism’	claims	that	all	thinking	is	valid	only	relative	to	a	
standpoint;	but	for	this	very	sentence,	that	is,	that	all	thinking	is	valid	only	relatively,	
relationism	demands	absolute	validity”	(1934/1982:	750).		But	Mannheim’s	‘sociologism’	is	
also	based	on	the	altogether	false	assumption	that	thinking	in	general,	and	judgements	in	
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particular	are	seinsgebunden.		According	to	Grünwald	this	has	to	be	false:	since	judgements	
can	be	studied	from	many	different	viewpoints—e.g.	those	of	sociology	or	psychology—
judgements	in	themselves	cannot	be	reduced	to	any	of	these	viewpoints	(1934/1982:	707).	
Finally,	Grünwald	argues	that	the	sociology	of	knowledge	could	never	replace	epistemology	
and	that	research	in	the	sociology	of	knowledge	would	always	have	to	presuppose	prior	
epistemological	research.		Epistemology	studies	the	validity	claims	of	judgements,	and	
these	validity	claims	are	independent	of,	and	prior	to,	external	factors	like	social	interests	
(1934/1982:	701-707).	–	Mannheim	did	not	have	the	argumentative	resources	needed	to	
rebut	these	attacks.	
	 There	are	also	important	and	weighty	objections	to	Mannheim’s	Altkonservatismus	
study.	It	is	easy,	for	example,	to	agree	with	Rodney	Nelson	(1992)	that	there	is	“a	relative	
paucity	of	social-historical	analysis	in	Conservatism;	[and	that]	a	demographic	portrait	of	
the	German	aristocracy	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	and	a	rigorous	documentation	of	
shifts	in	their	socioeconomic	status	would	have	added	greatly	to	the	analysis”	(1992:	43).	
Relatedly,	Nelson	also	laments	the	“static	essentialism	of	thought-styles”	and	the	idea	that	
“cultural	products	actually	contain	entelechies;	that	the	development	of	a	style	of	thought	
is	in	some	indeterminable	sense	prefigured	in	its	origin”	(1992:	45).	Other	critics	have	
attacked	the	tautology	in	Mannheim’s	imputation	of	thought-styles	to	groups:	Mannheim	
defines	groups	in	terms	of	thought-styles,	and	thought-styles	in	terms	of	groups	(Carlsnaess	
1981).	On	a	more	general	level,	later-day	sociologists	of	knowledge	have	lamented	
Mannheim’s	excluding	of	mathematics	and	the	natural	sciences	from	the	subject	matter	of	
their	discipline	(Bloor	1973;	cf.	Seidel	2011).	
	 And	yet,	all	these	important	criticisms	do	not	invalidate	the	attempt	to	define	political	
conservatism;	and	Mannheim’s	definition	remains	influential	even	today.	Moreover,	the	
essential	core	of	Mannheim’s	sociohistorical	study	of	philosophical	knowledge	can	easily	be	
formulated	without	any	“morphology	of	thought-styles.”	As	an	exercise	in	the	sociology	of	
philosophy	–	showing	how	historicism	and	relativism		first	emerge	in	political		conservatism		
–		Mannheim’s	Conservatism	remains	a	model	and	inspiration.		
	 Turning	to	the	broader	issue	of	how	to	think	about	historicism	and	relativism	I	want	to	
underline	for	a	last	time	the	interesting	historical	reflexivity	in	both	account.	Both	Simmel	
and	Mannheim	seek	to	understand	the	historical	conditions	of	the	possibility	of	their	own	
analyses	–	and	this	for	both	historicism	and	relativism.	This	type	of	historical	reflexivity	is	a	
rare	commodity	in	contemporary	sociology	of	philosophical	(or	scientific)	knowledge.		
	 Moreover,	Simmel’s	contribution	to	historicism	is	still	thought-provoking	and	well-
worth	reflecting	on.	That	historical	facts	are	not	simply	given	is	now	widely	taken	for	
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granted;	and	today	we	have	of	course	authors	like	Hayden	White	(1973)	and	Ian	Hacking	
(1995)	who	put	forward	more	radical	historiographical	claims.	Of	course	philosophers	today	
do	not	believe	that	historical	reflexivity	invariably	leads	into	an	abyss	–	like	Troeltsch	did;	
nor	that	it	can	justify	universal	values	–	like	Scheler	did.	But	we	still	struggle	with	explaining	
how	historical	reflexivity	and	historical	realism	are	to	be	reconciled.	In	that	sense	Simmel’s	
challenge	is	still	pressing	today.	
	 Finally,	as	far	as	Simmel’s	celebration	of	relativism	is	concerned,	it	is	a	bit	unfortunate	
that	he	runs	together	so	many	different	ideas	together	under	this	one	title.	Many	of	the	
things	Simmel	called	“relativism”	are	today	flourishing	research	projects	in	their	own	right	
(evolutionary	epistemology,	pluralism,	coherence	theories,	infinitism,	etc.).		
	 Turning	from	Simmel	to	Mannheim,	the	latter’s	contortions	to	escape	the	charge	of	
relativism	are	hardly	convincing	since	in	each	of	his	programmes	the	intellectual	costs	are	
too	high.	Spenglerism	with	its	ingredients	of	incommensurability,	skepticism	and	organicism	
is	not	an	attractive	option.	The	Hegelianism	of	the	Historismus	paper	avoids	epistemic	
relativism	only	at	the	cost	of	ontological	relativism	(the	absolute	presents	different	periods	
with	different	realities).	Concerning	the	free-floating	intelligentsia,	it	is	puzzling	how	
Mannheim	by	1931	could	suddenly	convince	himself	that	it	is	able,	after	all,	to	escape	“the	
fate”	so	vividly	described	in	Altkonservatismus.		
	
7.	Summary	and	Conclusions	
	
I	have	tried	to	show	Simmel’s	and	Mannheim’s	deep	and	extensive	preoccupations	with	
relativistic	and	historicist	themes.	Both	philosopher-sociologists	thought	of	relativism	and	
historicism	as	important	elements	of	their	methodology	for	the	sociology	of	philosophy;	
both	tried	to	understand	the	emergence	of	relativism	and	historicism	historically;	and	both	
reflected	systematically	on	which	forms	of	relativism	might	be	defensible.	Many	of	their	
central	questions	and	concerns	have	stood	the	test	of	time.		
	 There	are	also	of	course	important	differences	between	Simmel	and	Mannheim.	On	
the	one	hand,	as	we	move	historically	forward,	from	Simmel	to	Mannheim,	the	sociology	of	
knowledge	sheds	a	commitment	to	broad-brush	and	speculative	philosophy	of	history,	at	
least	as	far	as	the	case-studies	are	concerned.	This	is	progress.	On	the	other	hand,	the	early	
SImmel’s	theorizing	concerning	historicism	seems	more	sober,	more	twenty-first-century	
than	Mannheim’s	frequent	relapses	into	Spenglerism	or	Hegelianism	(at	least	in	his	
programmatic	texts).	At	the	same	time,	in	his	theoretical	writings	Mannheim	challenges	us	
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to	investigate	how	epistemology	must	change	to	do	justice	to	the	results	of	the	sociology	of	
knowledge.	To	me	the	question	is	still	relevant.	
	 Where	does	all	of	this	leave	us	concerning	the	issue	of	relativism,	especially	relativism	
in	the	context	of	the	sociology	of	knowledge?	The	question	is	worth	asking	in	this	general	
form,	since	clearly	the	issue	is	as	topical	today	as	it	was	a	hundred	years	ago	(cf.	Schantz	
and	Seidel	2011).	Obviously,	we	cannot	simply	adopt	‘the	right	answer’	from	Simmel	and	
Mannheim;	as	we	have	seen,	their	proposals	are	beset	by	many	problems.	But	perhaps	the	
real	lesson	is	in	any	case	an	indirect	one:	perhaps	the	connection	between	a	philosophically	
worked-out	commitment	to	relativism	on	the	one	hand,	and	historical	case	studies	in	the	
sociology	of	knowledge	on	the	other	hand	is	not	as	tight	as	is	often	assumed	by	card-
carrying	sociological	relativists.	Simmel	declared	himself	a	relativist	but	it	remained	unclear	
what	precisely	his	relativism	amounted	to.	And	yet	he	gave	us	a	highly	suggestive	and	
thought-provoking	investigation	into	the	influence	of	(theorizing	about)	money	on	our	
modern	worldview.	Mannheim	had	a	clearer	view	of	what	relativism	was	but	thought	of	it	
as	something	the	sociology	of	knowledge	had	to	avoid	at	all	costs.	His	attempts	to	do	so	
failed.	But	this	failure	had	no	direct	negative	consequences	for	his	brilliant	historical	work.	
Fortunately,	in	neither	case	did	the	alck	of	success	regarding	the	philosophical	handling	of	
relativism	weaken	the	quality	and	interest	of	the	sociological-historical	case	studies.	
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